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that the number of firms may not affect market power or even that the 
entry barriers in the long run may not be there at all. But the things 
that the examined literature says about the authors of the past 
concerning the uncovering of the causes of monopoly power are only 
vague and random fragments, lacking a background of systematic 
study or interpretation.  
 
3. Where to search 
Despite the wealth of suggestions we have highlighted so far, the 
historiography on the period prior to the Thirties has never focused on 
the subject of the causes of market power, thereby leaving a gap that 
requires filling. In the light of the review we have just carried out of 
the literature on competition on the one hand and on the pre-history of 
industrial economics on the other, we may well ask ourselves at this 
point in which direction we should be concentrating our research. 
 
3.1. Why not begin with the Classicals? 
As we have seen, the information we have gathered from the 
secondary literature tells us that the causes found by the classicals 
were in part endogenous, due to strategies carried out in order to 
compete, and in part exogenous, the fruit of obstacles independent of 
the firms intentions. These obstacles, we have argued, were held to be 
mainly short run124; in actual fact the literature insistently recalls that 
in classical thinking restraints on competition had no importance in 
the long run125. The monopoly power resulting from competitive 
                                                 
124 The term “mainly” refers to the fact that, for example for Smith, certain factors of 
production could be scarce “forever” (Smith 1776: I.7.24); J.S. Mill also believed that 
certain obstacles would last in the long run: for example custom, and the combinations 
(Schumpeter 1954 [1976]: 546), and also natural monopolies (Mosca 2008).  
125 Hovenkamp (1989a): “The analysis of classical political economists generally 
assumed that entry into markets was easy and could be accomplished very quickly” 
(144, italics ours). Machovec (1995): “From a classical view … harm ensued only if 
institutions existed  to inhibit the process of competition, independent of the presence 
of transitory monopoly profits due to P > MC” (17, our italics). 
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strategies was hence considered by the classicals to be always present, 
but continually threatened by competition, both actual and potential, 
except of course in the case of temporary exogenous obstacles126. We 
also need to add that such a conception was valid for the classicals in 
theory as well as in reality127, which means that competition was 
considered a very widespread phenomenon, on condition the market 
was free from legal restraints128. This optimism is further confirmed by 
the fact that in their writings the specific subject of monopoly takes up 
very little room129. If the market power that the firms obtained through 
strategic behavior did not worry the classicals because it was 
perpetually threatened, and if that due to exogenous obstacles did not 
go beyond the horizon of a short run that they judged unimportant, 
then it is clear that a detailed coherent examination of the causes of 
monopoly power cannot be found in their thinking. 
 
3.2. Why begin with the age of the marginalists? 
The reasons we have just illustrated direct us towards the age of 
the  marginalists, and this is what the secondary literature does on 
subjects akin to ours130. But why this particular age? 
                                                 
126 Hovenkamp (1989a): “Classicism’s faith that potential competition would discipline 
incipient monopolists was based largely on its concepts of market entry barriers. 
Classical political economy recognized only government restrictions as barriers to 
competitive market entry” (149). It would be correct to add: in the long run. 
127 Schumpeter (1954) “the ‘classics’ [were] firmly convinced that the competitive case 
was the obvious thing” ([1976]: 545).  This conviction holds true to the extent it is 
believed that the impediments were temporary or of small account.  
128 Backhouse (1990) notes that Smith on many occasions uses the term “liberty” to 
indicate competition, and defines it precisely “in terms of the absence of restraints” 
(60). It is interesting to note that Hovenkamp (1989b) indicates among the restrictions 
recognized by law also “a privately created restriction on entry, either by a contract 
including the restricted person as a willing participant, or else by a combination 
directed at other people as target” ([1991]: 148). 
129 Stigler (1987: 532): “Demsetz has counted only one page in 90 devoted to monopoly 
in The Wealth of Nations and only one in 500 in Mill’s Principles of Political Economy. 
Indeed the world ‘monopoly’ was usually restricted to grants by sovereign”. 
130 For example De Jong and Shepherd write about industrial economics: “There was 
major pioneering from the 1870s on” (2007: xxiii). Hovenkamp (1989a), on dealing 
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We can certainly find an answer in economic history. New 
phenomena like trusts, cartels, mergers, the vertical integration of 
firms, public utilities, and the railways131, raised new problems. 
Compared to the world of the classicals the provisional character of 
the obstacles to competition no longer seemed to apply132; in actual fact 
the short run in some industries seemed to be very long, and in certain 
cases to enter a market turned out to be very difficult even in the 
absence of legal barriers133. Faced with these new phenomena 
economists tried to understand why in certain markets firms 
continued to be few, if they should be worried about their size, or if 
this was on the contrary an advantage134, or whether one could count 
on their reciprocal rivalry135. These questions gave rise to a quantity of 
studies on the subject of monopoly power that was obviously without 
precedent136, as the review of the literature already provided has 
shown. 
From a methodological perspective, how were these problems 
dealt with? It is well known that the years at the turn of the century 
were a kind of crossroads for a variety of different positions, in which 
the already bitter controversies between old classical thought and the 
new ideas of the historical school also had to face the marginalist 
paradigm that was making headway. The historiography on the 
                                                                                                                    
with the debates on the subject of antitrust focuses on the “waning years of the 
nineteenth century” (105) and also Morgan (1993), dealing with competition, 
concentrates on this period. 
131 These subjects are dealt with in Hovenkamp (1989a). 
132 Hovenkamp (1989a) writes that in this age doubts began to be voiced about the 
classical idea that the savings of big firms were transferred on to consumers, and also 
that potential competition was always at work (144 ff.) 
133 Hovenkamp (1989a: 150-151). 
134 Hovenkamp (1989a) reports the various positions on the controversial hypothesis of 
“ruinous competition” (136-137).  
135 The latter is the idea that DiLorenzo and High (1988) attribute to the economists of 
the marginalist age. 
136 Hart (2001) argues that the various positions of the economists reflected the popular 
division between supporters and opponents of the trusts due to the effect of these 
organizations on their business (3). 
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subject of industrial economics shows that for a long time in the 
thought of this period classical theory co-existed with historical 
analyses based on the examination of cases and on statistics, as it did 
with marginalist ideas that were slowly gaining ground137; the 
historians of competition also point out this co-existence138. So we do 
not find a pure neoclassical theory in this period139, but rather 
methodological contaminations that gave rise to a great wealth of 
ideas, as has already been shown through our account in the previous 
sectors.  
One significant aspect which helps to explain why it is worthwhile  
concentrating our analysis on the age of marginalism concerns the 
history of the analytical tools used by economists. We recall that 
Cournot, Dupuit, Ellet, Von Thünen and others140 had used 
mathematical tools, leaving their methods and their results to those 
who came after them: demand functions, cost curves, and equilibrium 
conditions were available at the end of the century for use in economic 
thinking. Some of the theoretical developments on the causes of 
monopoly power also came about through the logical necessity 
imposed by the analytical tools employed141. 
                                                 
137 Hovenkamp (1989a): “The earliest economic studies of the trust problem were 
dominated by broad, historically based inquiries” (116), while Schumpeter notes, 
concerning the marginalists, that: “To a surprising extent they continued to look upon 
the competitive case as [in the preceding period, but] they complemented this vision  
by an analysis that was far superior to that of the ‘classics’” (1954 [1976]: 892). 
138 “For three decades prior to 1920 a bifurcation period existed” (Machovec  1995: 97). 
The many different positions on the subject of competition present in this period in the 
USA is the subject of Morgan (1993).  
139 The construction of the neo-classical paradigm was a slow process, and the 
“purification” of economic theory in the sense of reductionism occurred still more 
gradually. On reductionism in economics see Zamagni (2000).  
140 On which see Niehans (1990) and Ekelund and Hébert (1999). 
141 De Jong and Shepherd write that in this period in industrial economics “basic 
concepts were invented as the new ‘neo-classical’ microeconomic theory rapidly 
emerged” (2007: xix). If it is true that the formalization of the notion of perfect 
competition occurred only with Chamberlin and Robinson (Dennis 1977: 270 ff), and 
that beforehand all rigor was applied to the listing of its conditions, nonetheless 
mathematical tools were important precisely for the finding of these conditions, which 
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All this leads us to conclude that focus on the problem of 
monopoly and its causes increased a very great deal precisely in this 
age for two different kinds of reason. The first, linked to method, is 
that with the emergence of the notion of perfect competition, all 
strategic behavior of firms became a sign of monopoly, and as such 
caused worry. The second, on the other hand, concerns the new 
economic situation in which market power, whether generated by 
strategies or obstacles, showed itself to be long lasting and hence once 
again, though for other reasons, worrying. The difference between the 
two cases, however, should not be lost sight of: in the first case, as we 
have already seen, the identification of monopoly power was due to 
a change only in the theoretical model142,  while in the second it was 
to be imputed to new circumstances in the real world. 
 
3.3. Why the Italian marginalists?  
When speaking of the marginalist age it is of course essential to 
quote Schumpeter: “The most benevolent observer could not have 
paid any compliments to Italian economics in the early 1870’s; the 
most malevolent observer could not have denied that it was second to 
none by 1914”143. Having selected this age in the previous section as 
the most suitable one for our study, we certainly cannot neglect an 
examination of the economic theory whose primacy Schumpeter 
recognizes in such glowing terms!144  
There are, however, other good reasons for studying this Italian 
thought, and that concern the specific subject of this work: in Italy in 
the marginalist age a great many studies were written on the subject of 
                                                                                                                    
is the part of the history that interests us. 
142 This is Edgeworth’s opinion, according to Machovec (1995): “Edgeworth’s 
dissatisfaction with the concept of zero profit … was rooted in his realization that the 
new package of semantics and ideas attending the model of perfect competition were 
affecting how leading economists were reasoning about the market process” (288 
author’s italics). 
143 Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 855). 
144 Johnson (1956) also defines this age the “golden age of Italian economics” (506). 
 25
monopoly power145, which was by no means specific to the USA as is 
sometimes held146. Many Italian economists dealt with it147, in part as a 
reflection of American and European realities148, but also because of 
the industrial situation in Italy and the microeconomic policies 
followed, or not followed, by Italian governments in the decades at the 
turn of the century. It was the condition of Italian industry that 
encouraged thinking on the subject of monopoly power, characterized 
by “participations intersecting and in succession; holdings and groups, 
trade union agreements, also secret ones, interlocking directories149, 
with at least some big linkers; interlocking relations between industry 
and the big banks; concentration of activities in the industrial triangle; 
districts”150. The massive intervention by the government in the life of 
firms also provoked commentary from economists, thus revealing 
their idea on market power in the absence of this intervention151.  
                                                 
145 Let us cite the earliest: L. Cossa (1877), Boccardo (1882), E. Cossa (1888, 1901), Dalla 
Volta (1888, 1889-90, 1900, 1901, 1902) Supino (1893, 1902).  
146 Morgan (1993) seems to support it, and adds that both in the UK and in Germany 
the problem of competition between big firms was not raised (564, fn. 4), but De Jong, 
for example, recalls the German book of 1883, Die Kartelle by Kleinwächter (De Jong 
2007c: 62-63). In this sense also Gerber (1998). 
147 See the historical studies of Mazzocchi (1965), Avagliano (1974), Parisi (1992), 
Bientinesi (2003) and Augello e Guidi (2009). There are also works on the history of 
industrial economics in Italy: Bianchi (2007), Marchionatti and Silva (1992), Grillo and 
Silva (1989: 35-37), who, however, are referring to more recent periods to the ones 
dealt with here. 
148 See for example the case of Riccardo Dalla Volta, examined by Augello and Guidi 
(2009). 
149 The sharing of administrators that allows big companies to form a network of 
connections. 
150 Ciocca (2008: 159). Economic historians in general believe that the “phenomenon of 
industrial concentration in the sectors of higher economies of scale emerges in Italy at 
the start of the twentieth century ” (Amatori and Colli, 1999: 117). 
151 There was low competitiveness in the country in the years beginning with the 
victory of the Left (1876), due among other things to the collusion between the state 
and big firms, whereas in the age of Giolitti (1900-1913) there was “an intervention of 
the state against the dominant positions in crucial sectors and markets: telephones, 
maritime services, insurance, railways” (Ciocca 2008: 44). And furthermore: Giolitti 
opposed to private monopolies “the power of the state, public monopoly. He tried to 
counter contestability, by other private firms. He succeeded with the railways and 
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To these reasons taken from economic history, others can be added 
concerning the derivation of the ideas. The fact that the father of the 
theory of imperfect competition was Italian (Sraffa), as were two of the 
three founders of the new theory of oligopoly based on the notion of 
entry barriers (Sylos Labini and Modigliani) suggests that their ideas 
could have an Italian derivation. Also the wholly Italian history of the 
working out of U shaped average cost curves, an instrument of great 
importance for our subject, encourages us to continue exploring in this 
direction152. Moreover, the role the Italian marginalists played in the 
definition of the notion of natural monopoly also offers good prospects 
for research on the subject of monopoly power in general153. 
We conclude our line of argument by recalling, together with 
Modigliani, that the possibility of reading Italians in their own original 
language “is open only to the ‘happy few’” (1958: 216); we therefore 
think it is a duty and a privilege of Italians to carry out historical work 
on their primary sources.  
 
3.3.1. The economists considered 
In this work I deal especially with four Italian marginalists: 
Vilfredo Pareto, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Antonio De Viti de Marco and 
Enrico Barone. Three of them were contemporaries154 and three, but 
not the same three, died a very short time one from another155; their 
                                                                                                                    
telephones … with the foundation of INA and the exclusive state rights to life 
insurance” (151). “There remained those collusive forms between firms, particularly 
between industrial firms and banks” (153). “In the European culture of the time the 
concept of antitrust did not exist … but to oppose another firm to the firm that was 
sole agent of maritime services meant making that market a contestable one” (155).  
152 Keppler and Lallement (2006). They are important in particular for the structure-
conduct-performance approach, since they allow the identification of various market 
structures. 
153 Mosca (2008). 
154 Pantaleoni was born in 1857, De Viti de Marco in 1858 and Barone in 1859. Pareto, 
ten years before, in 1848. 
155  Pareto died in 1923, Barone in May 1924 and Pantaleoni in October of that year; De 
Viti de Marco lived for another two decades, dying in 1943. 
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biographers tell us of their deep personal ties156: for example 
Pantaleoni converted Pareto and Barone to economics157; we know 
about the brotherly friendship between De Viti de Marco and 
Pantaleoni; we have a wealth of correspondence between Pareto and 
Pantaleoni (De Rosa 1960) and between the latter and Barone 
(Magnani-Bellanca 1991)158. And again, it is well known that three of 
them (Pantaleoni, De Viti de Marco and Pareto) edited together a 
memorable series of the Giornale degli economisti159. It is precisely of our 
four economists that Einaudi (1934) speaks in his preface to the First 
Principles of De Viti de Marco as of those who gave: “such significant 
contributions to pure economic theory as to make their age rival … the 
most glorious periods of the history of our science ” ([1953]: 13). The 
point to emphasize here is the importance, for our subject, of 
considering the group composed of these four figures as a single 
entity, since it was precisely their frequent intellectual contact and 
their reciprocal influence that affected the genesis and development of 
the ideas on market power.  
It is by no means of secondary importance for the purposes of this 
study that they were all believers in free trade160 and that all four were 
politically very active. They intervened in the political life of Italy, 
                                                 
156 We provide here only one of the many testimonies of their interrelationship in this 
letter of Pareto’s to Pantaleoni: “All the theories I have set out are simply the germs of 
theories. Economists like Barone who have knowledge, culture and intelligence, should 
be the ones to develop these theories, and seek new truths ” (De Rosa 1960: 455, 
Pareto’s italics).  
157 Pareto was an engineer, Barone was in the military (Magnani 2003: 44-45, 72;  
Gentilucci 2006: 21). 
158 The subject of the Italian marginalists seen as a group in our opinion deserves a 
specific study.  
159  Until 1897 (Magnani 2003: 211). Ugo Mazzola was also one of the leading lights of 
the Giornale degli economisti. Barone took an active part in the project, as a reviewer 
(Gentilucci 2006: 28). Macchioro (1996: 10) speaks of a very violent Methodenstreit 
against all economic positivism led by the Giornale degli Economisti. We mention as an 
example of the primacy of the paper that Edgeworth’s study of monopoly was 
published for the first time in Italian in the Giornale degli Economisti in 1897. 
160 Pantaleoni and Pareto in the course of their lives abandoned laissez faire. 
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proposing reforms both in the Giornale degli economisti, as well as 
through direct participation: two were members of parliament (De Viti 
de Marco and Pantaleoni), and two tried to get elected (Barone and 
Pareto). Their period of militancy lasted from between the middle of 
the Eighties to the coming of fascism161, right in the middle of the time 
in which, as we have explained, the issues concerning monopoly 
power were most relevant; and since all four were free trade 
economists, we can expect to find thinking on competition policies in 
their writings. 
From the scientific point of view it is perhaps unnecessary to recall 
the reasons for their reputations, beginning with Pareto’s everlasting 
fame due mainly to the concepts of Paretian optimum, of cardinal 
utility, to his law of income distribution, and in general to his 
contributions to Walras’ theory of general economic equilibrium. 
Pantaleoni is considered the first economist to have applied the 
marginalist analysis to public finance162, in 1883; before Marshall he 
was the author of a textbook of pure economics, of writings on credit 
and other very innovative works163. The fame of De Viti de Marco is 
mainly due to the foundation of Scienza delle finanze as a purely 
theoretical discipline, as well as his important contributions to the 
theory of banking, international economics and the history of 
economic thought164. Finally, Barone is known mainly for his discovery 
of the theory of marginal productivity and for the socialist calculation 
debate. 
If it was unnecessary to mention the thinking that made them 
immortal, we do have to point out that the secondary literature did 
make some references to them on subjects relevant to ours; 
                                                 
161 After that time the only survivor of the four, De Viti de Marco, stays silent for more 
than a decade, drafting his textbook on Scienza delle finanze. 
162 Pantaleoni (1883) has priority over Emil Sax (1884); see Mosca (2006). 
163 The historiography on Pantaleoni is examined in Bini (1995). Augello and Michelini 
(1997). 
164 On De Viti de Marco’s contribution to the history of economic thought see Mosca 
(2005a). 
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Schumpeter for example recalls Pareto’s position on competition, as 
precursor of the modern duopoly theory165 and, very critically, that on 
monopoly166; he also mentions Pantaleoni’s study of industrial 
combinations167 and Barone’s on the theory of costs and the supply 
curve168. Sylos Labini cites Pantaleoni on the importance of fixed 
costs169, while Pareto is mentioned by Chamberlin for having 
distinguished “between acting like a monopolist and acting like a 
competitor”, and again for his contribution to the theory of duopoly170. 
And it is again to Pareto that Dennis attributes the abandonment of the 
idea of competition as activity171, while Backhouse recalls Pareto’s 
innovations for Walras’ theory of competition172; finally, Machovec 
calls Pareto’s description of the behavior of the monopolist 
“classical”173. To this list of contributions we add both De Viti de 
Marco’s article (1890) on the telephone industry174, and the 
fundamental links provided by Barone to the development of U 
shaped cost curves (Keppler and Lallement 2006) and to the concept of 
natural monopoly (Mosca 2008). As can be seen, our economists’ 
contributions seem very promising, however no scholar has yet dealt 
with the specific subject of monopoly power in their thought. 
 
3.3.2. The International diffusion of their ideas  
Another important reason why these four Italian marginalists were 
chosen is that they were leading figures on the international scene, 
making Italy a central driving force in economic debate. For personal 
                                                 
165 Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 972-973 and 981-982). 
166 Schumpeter (1949: 157). 
167 Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 857). 
168 Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 994). 
169 Sylos Labini (1957 [1962]: 89; 1995: 197-199). Meacci (1998: 3) emphasizes the link 
between Pantaleoni and Sraffa. 
170 Chamberlin (1933 [1962]: 16, 36-37, 40, 52, 222-223). 
171 Dennis (1977: 265). 
172 Backhouse (1990: 68-69). 
173 Machovec (1995: 183). 
174 See Petretto (2002) and Mosca (2007). 
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reasons they were cosmopolitan175, and this certainly helped them find 
a place in the cultural cross-fertilization of the period. They engaged in 
correspondence with economists throughout the world, and their 
work was reviewed in the best journals, in which they in turn 
published articles and reviews; their textbooks were translated into 
various languages176. The secondary literature confirms that Italian 
ideas made up a conspicuous proportion of those circulating among 
the economists of the marginalist age177; there are therefore good 
reasons for asking ourselves if their thinking gained currency on the 
specific subject of monopoly power.  
We shall also be evaluating their influence at the international 
level on the generations that followed them on this subject, and the 
outlook is promising because there is already some encouraging 
evidence available. The first regards Knight who, considered as we 
said to be the initiator of the model of perfect competition, would 
appear to owe his “rigorous notion of equilibrium” precisely to Pareto 
and Barone178. Further evidence concerns the influence of Pantaleoni’s 
theory of fixed costs on J.B. Clark179 and, through him, on the 
following theories of competition. De Viti de Marco inspired entire 
areas of research180; for our subject in particular there is evidence of 
                                                 
175 Pareto, born in Paris of a French mother, was nephew to an ambassador to 
Constantinople, and had one Russian  and one French wife; Pantaleoni, whose mother 
was English, gained his qualifications from school in Germany; De Viti de Marco, 
whose grandmother was English, married an American; Barone had very close links 
with German culture. 
176 Pantaleoni’s textbook of 1889 was translated into English in 1898, De Viti de 
Marco’s of 1928 was translated into German in 1932 and into English in 1936. Pareto’s 
1906  Manuale was translated into French in 1909, but then translated into English only 
in 1971; Barone’s Principi (1908) were translated into German in 1927 and into Spanish 
in 1942. 
177 On the diffusion of Italian thought see Asso (2001) and Asso and Fiorito (2001).  
178  Marchionatti (2003: 66). 
179 As already mentioned, as well as on Sylos Labini. Asso and Fiorito (2001: 344) argue 
that Clark’s theory of “overhead costs” (J.M. Clark 1923), owes a lot to Pantaleoni. 
180 Buchanan (2003: 283) recognized the importance of De Viti de Marco as “entry 
point” in the research project that led him to the Nobel Prize. 
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possible derivations from his ideas and the most recent theories of 
regulation of public utilities181. There is also a thread that from Pareto 
leads to Lerner, via Amoroso, and to Lerner’s famous index to 
measure market power, even if there is no proof of direct influence182. 
 
4. Why a history of the ideas on the causes of market power? 
Why is it important to follow up historically this notion of 
monopoly power? Which “arcane ideas” are revealed only if it is 
reconstructed by making use of this category? In other words, what 
makes the question we have raised a good historical question? We 
have several times stated that there are no studies on this subject: the 
suspicion may arise that if this history has not yet been written it is 
because it is  not important. We shall try to show why we think it is.  
1. We have already hinted at the possible derivation of the ideas of 
Sraffa as well as those of Sylos Labini and Modigliani from an Italian 
matrix: thanks to this category one might therefore write an Italian 
part of the history of the theory of non-competitive markets, which has 
not yet been written. We have also already mentioned possible 
influences of the Italian marginalists on the history of the thinking 
beyond their national borders and on later generations in 
environments akin to ours; research closely focused on the subject of 
the causes of market power may enable us to discover new lines of 
thought. So going back over the history employing this category 
allows us to find new derivations. 
2. Finding the causes of monopoly power is as useful as finding 
entry barriers. The reason why it is important to know the sources of 
market power is the same as why it is important to know what entry 
barriers are; both allow us to understand what causes prevent new 
firms from entering an industry. We know that the historiography has 
                                                 
181 Petretto (2002) does not trace the actual paths of the ideas, but offers useful hints on 
how to look for them. 
182 Keppler (1994b) attributes to Amoroso, a follower of Pareto, the formulation in 1930 
of an index similar to the one developed by Lerner four years later (597). 
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